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Millions of refugees have fled Syria because of directed violence from the Assad 
regime and by the Islamic State. The United States has a choice between admitting 
refugees to aid in human suffering, or to restrict Syrians based on security concerns. 
Humanitarian proponents believe the United States should increase resettlement to ease 
suffering and alleviate the migration crisis in the countries of first asylum. Security 
proponents believe insufficient vetting methods exist to prevent Islamic State operatives 
from entering the United States through the refugee program. This thesis evaluates the 
current U.S. refugee vetting policy against the humanitarian and security camps by 
examining the refugee experience and the refugee terrorist threat. This thesis concludes 
that there is no credible threat of Islamic State operatives infiltrating the U.S. refugee 
program, due to extensive vetting procedures already in place. Refugees have not 
committed any successful terrorist acts in the United States since the passage of the 
Refugee Act of 1980. The Islamic State remains a threat to Western populations, but fears 
of its infiltration through the refugee program are unrealistic. The Islamic State recruits 
Western operatives through electronic media, and risking exposure during the vetting 
process is unnecessary when easier means of access are available. 
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There is no such thing as love of the human race, only the love of this 
person or that, in this time and not in any other. ... The problem is not to 
defend universality, but to give these abstract individuals the chance to 
become real, historical individuals again, with the social relations and the 
power to protect themselves. ... The people who have no homeland must 
be given one; they cannot depend on the uncertain and fitful protection of 
a world conscience defending them as examples of the universal 
abstraction Man.…Woe betide any man who depends on the abstract 
humanity of another for his food and protection. Woe betide any person 
who has no state, no family, no neighborhood, no community that can 
stand behind to enforce his claim of need. 
—Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers 
 
More than five years of civil war in Syria resulted in an estimated 11 million 
refugees fleeing their homes into neighboring countries such as Turkey and Lebanon, or 
elsewhere in Syria.1 European countries and the United States have committed to 
resettling a percentage of the refugee population in accordance with established 
guidelines for humanitarian aid. Of the 11 million displaced Syrians since the outbreak of 
war in 2011, neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq 
have been struggling with 4.8 million of those refugees.2 Europe is providing sanctuary 
for more than 500,000 of the remainder, leaving the international community looking 
toward the United States to ease the burden of the substantial unexpected population 
increase.3 The United States has admitted close to its cap of 75,000 refugees nearly every 
year, but appears reluctant to admit Syrians. The United States has admitted less than 
1,000 Syrian refugees per year, with 356 in 2012, 798 in 2013, and 932 in 2014.4  By 
ignoring Syrians, the U.S. may be reinforcing terrorist ideology rooted in America’s 
                                                 
1European University Institute, “Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis—In the Middle East and 




4Nadwa Mossaad, “Refugees and Asylees: 2014,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Immigration Statistics, April 2016, 6, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Refugees%20%26%20Asylees%20Flow%20Report%202014_508.pdf.  
 2
disdain for Muslims, increasing the propensity for refugees to join terrorist organizations. 
The United States has set a precedent for accepting refugees from all over the world with 
varying demographics, and may not be fulfilling its own standards or best interest by 
favoring certain groups over others. 
The international rise of the Islamic State (IS, ISIL, or ISIS5) and its extreme 
behavior has further complicated the refugee policy because it enabled the organization to 
expand its attacks and ideology beyond the Syrian borders. Terrorist attacks and other 
illegal behavior committed by locals and foreign fighters with ties to the Islamic State 
that have occurred in Europe and the United States present challenges to policy makers, 
who must weigh the benefits of providing humanitarian assistance while maintaining 
national security. Current U.S. refugee policy encounters scrutiny from security-minded 
government agencies and individuals due to concerns of incomplete background 
information. Concerns arise over the judgment of refugee vetting procedures to determine 
whether the security measures are effective or ineffective in weeding out potential 
terrorists.  
The Syrian civil war has been ongoing since the Arab Spring of 2011, with 
multiple belligerents siding with the Syrian government in the Syrian Arab Republic, and 
a coalition of belligerents supporting the Syrian Opposition.6 The forces in the opposition 
not only desire the removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime from power, 
but also have conflicting goals for the outcome of the conflict. Among these groups is the 
Islamic State, proclaiming itself as the new caliphate and leader of all Muslims 
worldwide.7  With increased ferocity in attacks based on Jihadi-Salafism ideology both 
abroad as well as within Syria, the Islamic State seeks to garner support from newly 
                                                 
5The acronyms for the Islamic State have changed several times since the group’s emergence. This 
thesis will refer to the group as the Islamic State or IS. Uses of the remaining acronyms ISIS and ISIL are 
limited to their reference in direct quotes, but are understood to refer to the same group. 
6Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War,” RAND Corporation, 2014, 5–11, 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf.  
7Adam Withnall, “Iraq Crisis: ISIS Declares its Territories a New Islamic State with ‘Restoration of 




recruited operatives to carry out attacks on western countries.8 Traditionally relying on 
print and social media to spread their message, the Islamic State uses the fleeing Syrian 
refugees as a smokescreen to infiltrate their operatives into Europe, embed within the 
local population, and conduct attacks in areas that would have previously been difficult 
due to heavy security restrictions.9 Multiple countries surrounding Syria as well as in 
Europe have reported IS operatives posing as Syrian refugees with false identification or 
gaining transport on migrant boats.10 Cases of Islamic State attacks have already 
occurred, carried out by operatives in Paris and Brussels, and will be discussed in a later 
section of the thesis.   
In his 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, listed terrorism from the Islamic State 
and Al Qaeda second in his listing of global threats to the United States, with the primary 
threat being cyber and technology vulnerabilities.11 He cited the Islamic State’s 
“increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the 
world. ISIL’s narrative supports jihadist recruiting, attracts others to travel to Iraq and 
Syria, draws individuals and groups to declare allegiance to ISIL, and justifies attacks 
across the globe.”12  Director Clapper also emphasizes the record number of refugees and 
their capacity to “stress the capacity of host nations already dealing with problems 
relating to assimilation and possibly make displaced populations targets for recruitment 
by violent extremists.”13 
                                                 
8Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” The Brookings 
Institution, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, No. 19, March 2015, 7, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-
ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf. 
9Homeland Security Committee, “Syrian Refugee Flows: Security Risks and Counterterrorism 
Challenges,” November 2015, 3, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
HomelandSecurityCommittee_Syrian_Refugee_Report.pdf.  
10Ibid., 3. 
11James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Statement 
for the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016, 1–4.  
12Ibid., 4. 
13Ibid., 6.  
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The chief security concern for admitting Syrian refugees into the United States 
remains the lack of background information available to vet the refugees for entry. 
Numerous methods exist for collecting biometric data and interpersonal network 
connections for use by U.S. security agencies, though no thorough Syrian government 
database is available to exploit. Furthermore, the Assad regime has no interest in sharing 
any information that could possibly help the United States and European allies in 
resettling its displaced population. As FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach stated in 
a Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs: “The concern in Syria is that we don’t have the systems in places on the ground 
to collect the information. . . .  All of the data sets, the police, the intel services that normally 
you would go and seek that information [from], don’t exist.”14  Obtaining sufficient data 
to determine the appropriate security for the refugees remains a sticking point in the 
struggle to admit more legitimate refugees into the United States to support European 
counterparts. The lack of background information is similar to several other refugee 
situations, though recently the fears of terrorist infiltration seem to cause an emphasized 
concern. 
Despite a vast geographic separation between the United States and the Middle 
East, the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for carrying out attacks on U.S. soil. 
Due to extensive recruiting by print and internet media, IS has succeeded in radicalizing 
Muslims already residing in America to carry out attacks on the homeland. Several 
terrorist attacks have occurred on U.S. soil since the formation of the Islamic State, but 
attacks specifically claimed by the group include the May 3, 2015, Curtis Culwell Center 
shooting in Garland, TX, and the June 12, 2016, Orlando, FL, night club shooting.15 
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have customized collection opportunities to 
scan social media for radical postings and chatter to thwart future attacks. Other attacks 
motivated by radical Islam but not directly tied to the Islamic State have occurred on U.S. 
                                                 
14Homeland Security Committee, “Syrian Refugee Flows,” 4. 
15Terror Alert, “Full List of ISIS Attacks in US,” Last modified November 30, 2016, http://terror-
alert.com/news/full-list-of-isis-attacks-in-us?uid=28919.  
 5
soil, furthering instances of American Islamophobia and driving citizens to criticize the 
acceptance of refugees from areas occupied by the Islamic State. 
Due to the ongoing Syrian civil war and the horrific attacks on the civilian 
population by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and terrorist groups like the 
Islamic State, growing numbers of Syrian refugees are overcrowding camps and cities in 
neighboring countries of first asylum. In search of safety and an opportunity to live a 
normal life, refugees are expanding into Europe on a grand scale, compounding a global 
refugee crisis which demands the attention and action by global leaders. Recent criminal 
activity and terrorist attacks in European countries leave the Department of Homeland 
Security wary of allowing large numbers of Syrian refugees into the U.S. without the 
ability to adequately check applicant backgrounds. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic 
State have shown ambition into infiltrating refugee flows, causing national security 
experts to question the strength of the current refugee screening process to ensure that 
terrorist operatives are unable to penetrate its vetting measures.   
The mounting refugee crisis and the concerns for protecting national security have 
resulted in the following question: What are the security risks associated with accepting 
Syrian refugees into the United States, and how is this affecting U.S. refugee policy with 
respect to national security?  To address the question, two schools of thought have come 
to light. While non-governmental organizations stress the humanitarian necessity for the 
acceptance of further numbers of refugees to provide asylum for suffering Syrians, 
security officials are concerned with the lack of adequate background information to 
ensure terrorists are not using the refugee program to gain access to American soil. By 
weighing the current policy for background checks, history of terrorist activity committed 
by resettled refugees, as well as additional necessary security requirements, a 
determination can be made concerning the adequacy of the current checks and the safety 
of admitting larger numbers of refugees.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature regarding the security concerns for the acceptance of refugees is 
organized in three categories; The current U.S. policy regarding the acceptance of 
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refugees and the vetting process undergone prior to resettlement, the humanitarian 
imperative to rescue larger numbers of refugees from areas of conflict and neglect, and 
the reluctance to allow entry of Syrian refugees based on possible incomplete data 
available and the desire of the Islamic State to infiltrate operatives to the West through 
refugee programs. Each category is explained in the following review. 
1. Current Refugee Policy 
The current refugee policy is grounded in the Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
well as the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 protocol. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides the definition of a refugee, 
and emphasizes the specific elements which must be present to obtain official refugee 
status for the United States.16  The United States and other signatories to the 1967 
protocol have agreed to provide certain legal protections, assistance, and social rights to 
refugees.17  Signatories have agreed to ensure the safety of refugees by not returning 
them to a hostile homeland.18  The United States has made consistent commitments to 
resettling diverse groups of refugees based on adherence to the 1967 protocol. When 
determining the unique nature of refugees, regard for the undue hardships and violent 
forced displacement must be addressed to provide the proper context.   
The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants outlines the specific steps of 
the process that a refugee must undergo in order to gain determination as a viable 
candidate and the extensive multi-departmental security review that takes place to 
properly vet a candidate19  The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services expand upon 
the guidelines described by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, providing 
additional information to the series of robust information databases that are used to 
                                                 
16Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C., § 1101 (1952). 
17United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,” United Nations, 2011, 1, http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/
background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html.  
18Ibid., 4. 
19United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “Security Screening for Refugees Admitted 
to the United States: A Detailed and Rigorous Process,” 2016, http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/
Refugee%20resettlement%20-%20step%20by%20step%20USCRI.pdf.  
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screen each applicant, emphasizing the additional measures in place for Syrian 
candidates.20  
Amy Pope, the Obama Administration’s Deputy Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security, details the current vetting process by illustrating each step and 
vetting organization that is responsible for allowing only the most secure and most 
qualified applicants for resettlement.21  The U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
on Homeland Security, testified in a Congressional hearing regarding the various 
domestic and international databases that are used by different governmental departments 
to cross-check applicants.22  
2. Humanitarian Case  
Documentation on humanitarian necessity for refugee acceptance is centered on 
the ideal that the U.S. government is lacking in its commitment to resettle refugees on 
American soil, opting rather to provide humanitarian assistance by way of financial 
support to countries of first asylum. Considering the background information on the U.S. 
policy for refugees, the humanitarian case for expanding the acceptance of refugees is 
grounded in the moral commitment to the protection of displaced persons with regard to 
the increasing number of refugees living in deplorable conditions. Many U.S. Senators, at 
the request of numerous religiously backed organizations, have urged the White House to 
increase the number of refugees accepted for resettlement, citing a moral obligation to 
assist the large numbers of refuges that the neighboring countries cannot support.23  
                                                 
20U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee Processes and Security Screening,” Last 
modified December 3, 2015, https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening.  
21Amy Pope, “Infographic: The Screening Process for Refugee Entry into the United States,” The 
White House (blog), November 20, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/11/20/infographic-
screening-process-refugee-entry-united-states.   
22United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Admitting Syrian 
Refugees: The Intelligence Void and the Emerging Homeland Security Threat, Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, United States House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 
1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO 114–22, 2015), 32.    




Andrew Shacknove discusses the importance of definitions for determination of 
who is, and who is not, a refugee. Delineated in the definition are the protections afforded 
by international refugee legislation, which also assumes limitations on evacuees or 
displaced persons who do not meet the established criteria or refugee designation.24  The 
international refugee definition legislation, however, must be reasonably both narrow and 
broad, because states desire a reasonably narrow definition to restrict the number of 
refugees able to claim official refugee status.25 Larger numbers of refugees place 
additional financial and humanitarian burdens on the host states, driving the desire for 
fewer numbers. 
Human Rights First advocates for the protection of refugees and a renewal of 
efforts toward setting an example for our allied partners in the care and resettlement of 
refugees. The organization provides key recommendations for the return to the spirit and 
intent of the bipartisan Refugee Act of 1980.26  The group advocates for greater levels of 
humane and reasonable treatment of refugee claimants, citing that current procedures 
cause unnecessary detention and undue hardships on the asylum seekers.27  
Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo examine the history of 
refugees, as well as the social conflicts that lead to refugee crises. They expand the 
definition of refugees through analysis of political regimes, economic strife, and global 
trends toward refugee flows, then provide recommendations for the international 
community to aid in the care and resettlement of refugees.28 
Jennifer Hyndman addresses the human aspect of refugees, and the inadequate 
response of refugee organizations and western governments to properly care for them. 
She describes the how donor governments classify refugees as more of a burden than a 
                                                 
24Andrew E. Shacknove, “Who Is a Refugee?” Ethics 95, no. 2 (1985), 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2380340.  
25Ibid., 277. 
26Human Rights First, “Renewing U.S. Commitment to Refugee Protection: Recommendations for 
Reform on the 30th Anniversary of the Refugee Act,” March 2010, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=22158. 
27Ibid.  
28Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo. Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), v-vi. 
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humanitarian necessity, resulting in a hands-off approach that keeps refugees in countries 
of first asylum instead of opting to resettle them.29  This view comes into play with 
possible inflated security concerns in the United States leading to the reluctance to 
resettle refugees in America in favor of increasing humanitarian aid to regional refugee 
hosts. 
Risks of increased violent political action in the form of demonstrations or 
association with terrorist organizations may increase as fighting-age refugees are left 
waiting in refugee camps in close proximity to the conflict area. Jack Goldstone discusses 
the propensity for youths to become involved in political movements and violence 
following a population change.30  He emphasizes the importance of relocating the 
stagnant population of disillusioned fighting-age youths to reduce the propensity for 
violence.31  He specifically stresses the link between violence and the ability of an 
absorbing society to handle the large influx of displaced persons.32   
Refugee camps have shown to inadequately provide for long-term needs of the 
population they are meant to support. In a 2009 UN Human Development Research 
Paper, Bart de Bruijn researched protracted refugee camps in six countries: Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Thailand.33  His report outlines several key 
issues such as: legal protections, health, education, gender-related concerns, and food 
security, then compares conditions in camps against UN standards and the quality of life 
in host country populations.34 
                                                 
29Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 2. 
30Jack A. Goldstone, “Demography, Environment, and Security: An Overview,” in Demography and 
National Security, ed. Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 47.  
31Ibid., 47.  
32Ibid., 52.  
33Bart de Bruijn, “The Living Conditions and Well Being of Refugees,” United Nations Development 




3. Security Concerns 
Documentation concerning security, largely released by representatives of the 
U.S. government, is centered on the fear that Syrian refugees have direct or indirect ties 
to terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State. Though terrorism occurs for many 
causes outside those of radical Islam, much of the focus in the American understanding 
of terrorism stems from the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Christopher 
Hewitt discusses the history of terrorism in America, addressing the more recent attacks 
with roots in radical Islam, as well as homegrown terrorist from right wing extremists, 
revolutionary left wing movements, and terror movements based in race relations or 
religion.35 His study shows the relatively low incidents of foreign terrorism, and the high 
incidents of terrorist violence from right-wing groups which is largely overlooked in the 
modern understanding of terrorism.36 Martha Crenshaw evaluates common themes in 
terrorist motivations as both behaviors of the state and the goals of the organizations for 
which the state is oppressing as preconditions for terrorism.37  
Some researchers argue that American citizens are more likely to commit terror 
acts than actors from outside organizations. In a 2014 thesis, Kyle Recker concluded: 
“terrorism conducted by United States citizens, both native and naturalized, is the 
predominant form of terrorism in the United States.”38  Additionally, in a report by the 
Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, Kevin Strom, et. al, advise homeland security 
officials to continue to pursue groups like Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM), 
but also to focus on homegrown groups, stating: “Less than half of U.S. terror plots 
                                                 
35Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to Al Qaeda, (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 16–19. 
36Ibid., 15. 
37Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), 
379–399.  
38Kyle Recker, “Citizenship and Terrorism: The Significance of a Pathway to Citizenship on 
Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), v, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
41434. 
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examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white 
supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways.”39 
To focus on the threat of radical Islam and the fears of increased jihadist attacks 
on American soil, Daniel Byman details the rise of groups such as Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State. Byman discusses jihadist fighters in the immediate regions of influence of 
the terror groups, and addresses the recruitment and radicalization of westerners to act in 
a “lone wolf” capacity in support for the cause.40 Understanding the motivations behind 
jihadist groups such as IS provides valuable information as to their methods of operation 
and end-state goals. Due to the specific nature of the Islamic State’s disdain for western 
cultures and their overwhelming presence in Syria, fears of IS operatives infiltrating the 
refugee program abound.  
The Homeland Security Committee addresses terrorist operatives gaining access 
to major European cities by the flows of refugees from war-torn Middle Eastern 
countries, providing a greater ease in infiltrating security measures that had not 
previously been available.41  Their concerns include relaxed travel restrictions in Europe, 
and the possibility that the Islamic State may try to exploit weaknesses in travel 
security.42 
In contrast to the belief that security measures should be stronger, Seth Jones of 
the RAND Corporation testified to the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, regarding the different active 
terrorist groups and their direct and indirect threat to U.S. national security. He 
specifically mentions the relatively low threat of any terrorist attacks by refugees, citing 
specific examples of ten refugees that have been involved with charges of terrorism, and 
                                                 
39Kevin Strom et al., “Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. 
Terrorist Plots, 1999–2009” (Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 
2010), 1. 
40Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone 
Needs to Know, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 58.  
41Homeland Security Committee, “Syrian Refugee Flows,” 3.  
42Ibid., 6.   
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none of them have been from Syria.43  Additionally, Alex Nowrasteh of the CATO 
Institute conducted a risk analysis of terrorist attacks and their relation to immigration 
between 1975 and 2015, determining the risk of an American perishing from a terrorist 
attack committed by a refugee as 1 in 3.64 billion per year.44 
Protracted refugee camps may foster terrorism rather than simply provide needs 
for displaced persons. Gil Loescher and James Milner also address the security concerns 
inherent in maintaining protracted refugee camps, calling attention to the greater 
propensity for regional instability and the recruitment of displaced persons into a life of 
crime or terrorism because of prolonged life in a refugee camp.45  They charge donor 
governments with assisting refugees in repatriation, local integration, or resettlement of 
refugees to provide a lasting way of life outside of a refugee camp.46  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research evaluates current refugee policy with respect to the likelihood of 
terrorist infiltration into the United States through the refugee program.   Current policy 
regarding the vetting process for refugees, as well as commitment to international 
agreements are evaluated to determine if the United States is fulfilling the spirit and 
intent of the agreements. Humanitarian viewpoints are evaluated to stress the importance 
of the United States as a larger participant in the growing international refugee crisis. 
Security measures are evaluated to determine the likelihood that a terrorist operative may 
succeed in penetrating the selection process and security background screenings to gain 
entrance to American soil with the sole purpose to conduct an attack.   
This research examines the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe as 
well as on American soil following the rise of the Islamic State, and the extent to which 
                                                 
43Seth G. Jones, “The Terrorism Threat to the United States and Implications for Refugees” (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), June 24, 2015, 6–7, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT433.html. 
44Alex Nowrasteh, “Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, 
No. 798, September 13, 2016, 1, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_1_1.pdf. 
45Gil Loescher and James Milner, “The Significance of Protracted Refugee Situations,” in The 
Adelphi Papers, vol. 45, no. 375, 2005, DOI: 10.1080/05679320500212098, 8. 
46Ibid., 18. 
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those attacks were carried out by refugees. Resource material used to conduct this 
research are the policy documents related to the United States refugee program, 
government statements regarding the background check process, humanitarian 
documentation regarding the importance of swift refugee resettlement, news reporting on 
terrorist attacks after the Syrian conflict started, material on the motives and methods of 
jihadist terrorism, statistics on terror attacks committed by refugees, and testimony 
relating to the adequacy of current security measures. Weighing the cases presented by 
the humanitarian and the security camps against the actual terror attacks committed by 
refugees, this research determines the relative risk of the U.S. refugee program, and 
provides recommendations to improve policy, regardless of research outcomes. 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
Chapter II examines an overview of the current refugee policy, explained by the 
source documentation relating to the international commitments made to aid in the care 
and resettlement of refugees. This section addresses the current process for vetting 
refugees, and the databases that are used to ensure the viability of candidates for 
resettlement into the United States. This documentation serves as the baseline for 
American involvement in the global refugee crisis, and whether U.S. policy is consistent 
with the commitments that have been made to international partners. 
Chapter III addresses the humanitarian necessity of the care and resettlement of 
refugees. Testimonies from non-government organizations and humanitarian experts are 
evaluated to stress the importance of refugee care and resettlement outside of the 
originating region. Conditions in refugee camps are discussed as they relate to the 
likelihood that poor conditions may lead to disillusioned, fighting-age refugees that may 
seek stability through joining a terrorist organization. 
Chapter IV addresses the security concerns regarding the inability to gather 
complete data on candidates for resettlement into the United States. Information on the 
motives of terrorism, American attacks conducted by groups other than those with 
Islamic jihadi background, and the threat specifically posed by the Islamic State are 
discussed. Terror attacks carried out by resettled refugees are examined to explain the 
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likelihood, or lack thereof, regarding the threat of refugees in carrying out terrorist 
attacks. Security concerns are raised concerning the dangers in protracted refugee camps, 
and how that may influence fighting-age refugees to join terrorist activity, posing greater 
threat to U.S. national security. Humanitarian assistance in the form of resettlement as 
well as providing funds and supplies to regional partners are examined. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion based on the information contrasted from the 
three examined aspects. Recommendations are offered from the two major options posed 
to policymakers: 1) Resettle larger numbers of refugees to aid in the humanitarian crisis 
and reduce the number of potential terrorist recruits, or 2) Restrict refugee resettlement 
based on the extremely slight chance that a terrorist may infiltrate the program, ignoring 
refugee plight while bolstering security.  
15
II. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
A. CURRENT POLICY 
To evaluate the security concerns for the acceptance of Syrian refugees, the 
current policy for accepting refugees must be examined. The 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was written in response to the large 
number of refugees in Europe following World War II and formed the basis of the 
modern understanding of refugees. The United States is not a signatory to the 1951 
Convention, but did ratify the 1967 protocol. The Convention defines a refugee as 
follows:  
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than 
personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.47 
The 1967 protocol retains most of the 1951 Convention definition, however it 
omits the text binding refugee status to events occurring before January 1, 1951, and 
related follow-on text.48 
The current U.S. refugee policy is grounded in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, which draws from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
similarly defines a refugee as: 
Any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which 
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
47UN General Assembly, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 14 December 1950, A/
RES/429, Article I A(2),  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f08a27.html. 
48United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
January 31, 1967, Article 1, Paragraph 2, 46, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/
convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html. 
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return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.49 
The United States and other signatories have agreed to provide legal protections, 
assistance, and social rights to refugees according to the provisions of the 1967 protocol 
to the 1951 Convention.50  Some of these rights and protections include unobstructed 
travel through the country of resettlement, access to education, housing, public relief and 
assistance, and the right to work.51 Within the guidelines of the United Nations 
convention in Article 33, the signatories are bound to a principle of non-refoulement, 
declaring, “No contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”52 Though a refugee may desire to return to their homeland when 
hostilities have ceased, protracted civil wars or other conflicts may prevent the return 
from occurring, resulting in a permanent residency, and ultimately citizenship, through 
the host country.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act has been amended several times since its 
1952 provisions. In 1965, restrictions were removed on preferences for national origin 
and wage restrictions, though refugees were still listed as the last category of preference 
for entry.53  In 1990, restrictions were lifted to increase diversity and overall immigrant 
numbers, though no significant changes were made regarding refugees.54  Title 8 of the 
Federal Code of Regulations specifies the procedures for immigration, with specific 
provisions for refugees seeking resettlement in the United States. These regulations 
49Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C., § 1101 (1952). 
50United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,” United Nations, 2011, 1, http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/
background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html.  
51Ibid., 4.   
52Ibid., 30. 
53Immigration and Nationality Act, § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C., § 1153, (1965). 
54Immigration and Nationality Act, § 131(c)(1), (1990).  
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outline eligible refugees, processing requirements, wait listing, determinations of 
allowable refugee numbers, and the termination of refugee status.55  After resettlement, 
refugees have one year to apply for permanent residence, then are encouraged to apply 
for full citizenship after a residency period of five years.56 
The president outlines refugee policy and goals annually, by submitting a 
consultation document to Congress to outline the refugee policy pursuant to section 
207(d)(1) and (e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states:  
Before the start of each fiscal year the president shall report to the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the 
Senate regarding the foreseeable number of refugees who will be in need 
of resettlement during the fiscal year and the anticipated allocation of 
refugee admissions during the fiscal year.57   
Depending on the global number of refugees within a given year and any 
emerging humanitarian crises, the president may seek to increase or decrease  the 
allowance. Due to the ongoing civil war in Syria and the millions of refugees that have 
fled to neighboring countries and into Europe, President Obama requested and received 
additional allowance in fiscal year 2016. 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration statistics show that 
refugees seek asylum within the United States from 61 known countries, with the largest 
numbers of refugees between 2005 and 2014 fleeing from Burma, Iraq, Bhutan, Somalia, 
and Cuba, respectively.58  The United States remains committed to accepting refugees to 
fulfill humanitarian obligations to the refugees as well as to the many other countries that 
share in the endeavor. Through the past three years, the United States has accepted nearly 
the entire authorized cap of 70,000 refugees per year, with 69,933 in 2015, 69,987 in 
2014, and 69,926 in 2013, demonstrating its commitment to the global humanitarian 
                                                 
55Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, § 207, 8 U.S.C., § 1522, Amended June, 13, 2003.  
56Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, § 209.1, 8 U.S.C., § 1522, Revised July, 6, 1998.   
57Immigration and Nationality Act, § 207(d)(1), 8 U.S.C., § 1157 (2013).  
58Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2014 Refugees and Asylees, 
Table 14, https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2014-refugees-and-asylees. 
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cause.59 Of the admitted Syrian refugees since their civil war started in 2011, the U.S. has 
resettled 29 in 2011, 31 in 2012, 36 in 2013, 105 in 2014, 1,682 in 2015, and 10,740 in 
2016 as of August 31.60  In comparison, Germany has pledged 43,431 availabilities for 
Syrians, and the remainder of European Union countries have pledged 51,205 
availabilities.61  Australia pledged to resettle an additional 12,000 Syrian refugees, nearly 
doubling their previous annual total cap of 13,750.62   
Based on the severity of the global refugee crisis, President Obama requested 
Congressional approval for an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees and an additional 5,000 
refugees from other countries in fiscal year 2016, raising the total number of refugees 
resettled in the U.S. from 70,000 to 85,000.63  The U.S. surpassed the stated goal of 
resettling 50% of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
referred refugees for resettlement in the United States by resettling 67% of the global 
total in 2014.64 In addition to resettling refugees, the U.S. has been the greatest single 
financial donor to the UNHCR, giving $1.28 billion in fiscal year 2014.65 
B. ADMISSIONS AND VETTING PROCESS 
The Executive Branch relies on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), 
organized through the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration (PRM), to oversee the refugee admissions process. The USRAP consists of 
several governmental and non-governmental partners that work closely with UNHCR in 
                                                 
59U.S. Department of State, Refugee Admission Statistics, last modified December 31, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/.  
60U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Summary of Refugee 
Admissions as of 31-Aug-2016, Retrieved from: http://www.wrapsnet.org/Portals/1/arrivals/arrivals fy 
2013/Refugee Admissions Report 2016_08_31.xls?ver=2016-09-06-090023-860. 
61Amnesty International, “Syria’s Refugee Crisis in Numbers,” Last modified December 20, 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/.  
62Hilary Whiteman, “Australia to Take 12,000 Refugees, Join Coalition Airstrikes in Syria,” Cable 
News Network, last modified September 9, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/asia/australia-refugees-
syria-airstrikes/index.html. 
63U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Report to the Congress, 
“Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016,” October 1, 2015, iii-iv, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/247982.pdf. 
64Ibid., 3.  
65Ibid. 
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receiving the applications for resettlement and guides applicants through the entire 
process, from identifying candidates, administrative processing, security screening, and 
eventually travel and resettlement.66  USRAP reviews the global refugee situation, 
determines the U.S. level of involvement for resettlement, and evaluates the humanitarian 
need for U.S. intervention.67  USRAP prioritizes refugees into one of three groups:  
“Priority 1 – Individual cases referred to the program by virtue of their circumstances and 
apparent need for resettlement; Priority 2 – Groups of cases designated as having access 
to the program by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for 
resettlement;  Priority 3 – Individual cases from designated nationalities granted access 
for purposes of reunification with family members already in the United States.”68   
The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants and the Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security outline the specific steps of the process that a refugee 
must undergo to gain determination as a viable candidate and the extensive multi-
departmental security review that takes place to properly vet a candidate.69 A complete 
background check through all available information and biometric databases maintained 
by several key government agencies is completed and continually reexamined before the 
refugee is selected for resettlement and eventually transported to the U.S.   
Many agencies are involved in collecting and sharing information to ensure that 
the right people are gaining lawful entry into the United States, taking full advantage of 
the limited information that is available. After fleeing the hostile territory and 
establishing refugee status in a country of first asylum through the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), all available biodata and personal information is 
                                                 
66U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “The United States Refugee Admissions Program 




68U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, “Proposed Refugee 
Admissions,” 6.  
69United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “Security Screening for Refugees Admitted 
to the United States,” 2016, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/577d437bf5e231586a7055a9/t/
57a24d23893fc0eb3919ad0f/1470254386734/USCRI+Security+Screening+Process+%285.16.16%29.pdf.  
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collected about the applicant along with iris scans and other biometrics.70  The UNHCR 
then conducts interviews to determine refugee status, and forwards only the strongest 
candidates for resettlement, amounting to “less than 1 percent of the global refugee 
population.”71  Following the review and collection of information from the UNHCR, the 
applicant’s information is sent to the United States for security review while the applicant 
remains outside United States territory. 
After receiving the refugee application at the Resettlement Support Center, a file 
is created for the potential asylee and information is collected for biographic security 
review.72  Multiple U.S. security agencies such as the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), Intelligence Community, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), and the State Department screen the candidate for indicators 
that would cause security concerns such as membership in networks with recognized 
terrorist members or other legal and criminal concerns.73 Syrian cases are further 
scrutinized for fraud detection by DHS and USCIS.74  Additional checks are conducted 
through the U.S. Department of State’ Security Advisory Opinion, placing supplementary 
measures in place for high-risk candidates with issues such as multiple variations in name 
or spelling.75 Further interviews are conducted by USCIS to determine validity of the 
candidate and to vet the applicant for legal U.S. admissibility.76 
During additional review, “an applicant’s biographic information and biometric 
information are vetted against multiple law enforcement and intelligence databases 
including the State Department’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which 
includes the Government’s terrorist watch list information, the Federal Bureau of 
                                                 




74United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “Security Screening for Refugees Admitted 
to the United States.” 
75U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee Processes and Security Screening,” Last 
modified December 3, 2015, https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening.  
76United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “Security Screening for Refugees Admitted 
to the United States.”  
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Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and 
DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT).”77  CLASS also contains 
information in other databases such as: “National Counterterrorism Center/Terrorist 
Screening Center, the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), Interpol, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Health and Human Services, and FBI extracts of the 
National Crime Information Center’s Wanted Persons File, Immigration Violator File, 
Foreign Fugitive File, [and the] Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File.”78  
Fingerprints are also run through the Department of Defense’s Automated Biometric 
Identification System, which contains biographic information collected from Iraq.79 If 
any anomalies arise from information previously recorded throughout the multi-agency 
screening, the entire security screening process repeats to reveal any new information 
through USCIS’s Controlled Application Review and Resolution Process (CARRP).80 
Following a successful screening through each of the aforementioned agencies’ 
databases, the Department of Homeland Security conducts interviews through USCIS and 
collects biometric data.81 USCIS interviewers are specifically trained in fraud detection, 
applicant credibility, refugee inadmissibility, refugee law, and country conditions from 
which the refugees fled.82  Fingerprints will be taken during the interview, and compared 
against databases for the FBI, DHS watch lists and immigration data, and Department of 
Defense (DOD).83 If any security concerns have arisen through these checks, the member 
will be rejected from consideration. A medical screening will take place for members 
without security concerns, and certain curable illnesses will be treated before entry into 
the United States.84 Cultural orientation classes will be offered to the prospective 
                                                 
77United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Admitting Syrian 
Refugees, 32.   
78U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee Processes and Security Screening.”   
79United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “Security Screening for Refugees Admitted 
to the United States.”  
80U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee Processes and Security Screening.”  
81Pope, “Infographic: The Screening Process.” 
82U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee Processes and Security Screening.”  
83Pope, “Infographic: The Screening Process.” 
84Ibid. 
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members to prepare them for entry into American society, and a proper location will be 
selected for them by a Non-Governmental Organization based on previously settled 
family members and any geographically relevant health concerns.85 Following the 
aforementioned security checks, the members will have travel arranged for entry into the 
U.S.   
The International Organization for Migration arranges the travel to the United 
States, and the member is screened through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 
National Targeting Center passenger list as well as the Transportation Security 
Administration’s Secure Flight Program.86 Throughout the entire process, any indication 
of a security concern in any of the databases will result in process suspension until the 
security issue has been clarified. At this phase, the cleared refugees will arrive in the 
United States, and will have a year to apply for their green card, initiating a subsequent 
set of security checks by the U.S. government.87 Refugees are vetted for security with 
more scrutiny than any other person trying to enter the United States.   
With the understanding of the extensive background checks that refugees 
encounter before they arrive in the U.S., citizens can begin to understand the depth and 
scope of the features that security professionals possess to scrutinize the refugee 
candidates. Though various biometric and family data points are examined, certain gaps 
in intelligence exist based on incomplete records held or released by Syrian institutions. 
U.S. refugee policy is designed to provide vital humanitarian assistance to the people that 
most require it, and U.S. security agencies strive to resettle as many refugees as possible 
while ensuring that critical security concerns are assuaged.   
                                                 
85Pope, “Infographic: The Screening Process.” 
86Pope, “Infographic: The Screening Process”; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Refugee 
Processes and Security Screening.” 
87Ibid. 
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III. HUMANITARIAN CASE 
Research on the humanitarian necessity for refugee acceptance is centered on the 
ideal that the U.S. government is lacking in its commitment to resettle Syrian refugees on 
American soil, opting instead to provide humanitarian assistance by way of financial 
support to countries of first asylum. The humanitarian case for expanding the acceptance 
of refugees is grounded in the moral commitment to the protection of displaced persons 
with regard to the increasing number of refugees living in meagre conditions. This 
chapter will examine the importance of refugee status, conditions in refugee camps, the 
limited benefit of aiding from a distance, if states have the right to exclude certain people 
from entry, and how to move forward in providing the appropriate aid.  
Syrian asylum seekers constituted 9.4% of the global total in 2013, composing 
56,400 requests, and representing the largest share of any country of the total 200 
countries or territories reporting.88  In 2014, Syrian requests increased 166% to 149,600, 
representing 17.8% of the global total.89  In 2013, 1,546 Syrians applied for asylum in the 
United States.90 Total asylum applications to the United States in 2014 was 121,160, 
second only to Germany with 173,070 requests.91  Syrian-specific requests to the United 
States were not provided in the 2014 UNHCR report. Large numbers of Syrian refugees 
awaiting resettlement in camps within countries of first asylum present a different range 
of challenges that may be considered by policy makers when considering the ratio of 
financial aid provisions versus resettlement approvals. 
                                                 
88UNHCR, “Asylum Trends 2013: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries,” last accessed 
January 12, 2017, 17, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5329b15a9/asylum-levels-trends-
industrialized-countries-2013.html.  
89UNHCR, “Asylum Trends 2014: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries,” last accessed 
January 12, 2017, 23, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/551128679/asylum-levels-trends-
industrialized-countries-2014.html.  
90UNHCR, “Asylum Trends 2013: Levels and Trends,” 29.  
91UNHCR, “Asylum Trends 2014: Levels and Trends,” 20.  
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A. WHY DO DEFINITIONS MATTER? 
Status as a refugee holds a great deal of weight for international agreements 
concerning the level of aid afforded to those claiming refugee status. Reviewing from the 
earlier definition from the Immigration and Nationality Act, the key terms in refugee 
definition are: “outside any country of such person’s nationality … unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country … because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution.”92 Refugees 
have lost the ability to claim political goods from their government, and thus, rely on 
special humanitarian aid to survive.   
Irrespective of governance system, citizens trust their state for the provision of 
reasonable political goods. As Andrew Shacknove states, “In exchange for their 
allegiance, citizens can minimally expect that their government will guarantee physical 
security, vital subsistence, and liberty of political participation and physical 
movement.”93  By fleeing the homeland which has failed to provide basic goods, the 
refugee bravely accepts statelessness in search of necessary assistance to acquire the 
basic needs of life and decency.94 Shacknove argues that the internationally accepted 
definition of a refugee holds significant importance because “states reason in reverse 
from their fear that they will be forced to shoulder the burden of assisting refugees 
unilaterally to a narrow conception of refugeehood [sic] which limits the number of 
claimants.”95  The Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war into neighboring countries of first 
asylum meet all of the criteria enforced by UNHCR, and therefore warrant consideration 
of the countries committed to protection of the stateless disadvantaged. Denying access to 
certain refugees based on loosely linked security concerns, simply because the country 
they are fleeing is an area controlled by a terrorist group such as ISIS, or because they are 
Muslim, contradicts more than 70 years of U.S. precedent in refugee resettlement as well 
as internationally-recognized agreements to humanitarian assistance.   
                                                 
92Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C., § 1101 (1952).  
93Shacknove, “Who Is a Refugee?” 281. 
94Ibid., 283.   
95Ibid., 277. 
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Frequently, countries of first asylum may be ill-equipped to handle such large 
inflows of refugees, though as the UN Security Council resolved in 1998, the “primary 
responsibility of States hosting refugees [is] to ensure the security and civilian and 
humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements in accordance with international 
refugee, human rights, and humanitarian law.”96 Countries like Lebanon, which are 
hosting over 1.5 million Syrian refugees, are struggling to provide care for the refugees in 
addition to providing goods to their own citizens, and fear that large numbers of refugees 
may attract terrorists.97  Lebanese schools are having difficulty in providing education to 
Lebanese and Syrian students, with almost 250,000 Syrian children in Lebanon out of 
school.98 As a result, the Lebanese Education Ministry had to “introduce two-shift school 
days in the public education system. The first shift is for Lebanese students, and it is open 
for Syrian students if there is space. The second shift, which starts between 2:00 and 2:30 
p.m., is only for Syrian children.”99  Without education, the children will have little 
opportunity to provide economically, and may be drawn to terror groups as a means of 
survival. 
Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo expand the definition of refugees through the 
different iterations of international refugee crises through analysis of political regimes, 
economic strife, and global trends toward refugee flows.100  The ability to claim refugee 
status imparts a privileged level of protection from the host country and the international 
community, which therefore places specific importance on which people meet the criteria 
for protection.101  Refugees are not simply choosing to relocate based on voluntary 
decisions, but rather, “Movement is most clearly involuntary when it is forced -- that is, 
                                                 
96UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1208, November 19, 1998, 2.  
97Olivia Alabaster, “Syrian Refugees: Between War and Crackdown in Lebanon,” Al Jazeera, 
November 4, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/syrian-refugees-war-crackdown-
lebanon-161102173130178.html. 
98Jessica Brandt and Robert L. McKenzie, “Addressing the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Recommendations 
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when it occurs as a response to life-threatening violence, exercised by an agent or 
occurring as a by-product of circumstances. Violence includes both clear and immediate 
physical violence, and coercive circumstances that have similarly threatening effects.”102  
Syrian refugees clearly meet the criteria established by the UNHCR, fleeing Syria to 
escape civil war and President Bashar al-Assad’s use of violence and chemical weapons 
directed upon the civilian population.103 It is important to note that Syrian refugees are 
fleeing their country because of direct violence upon them at the hands of their 
government leadership as well as by fighters of the Islamic State. Their migration is not 
merely for convenience or economic opportunity, but rather for survival. 
Refugees have risked everything to flee violence and oppression, and have 
suffered greatly at the hands of the state that had been responsible for providing their 
needs. When considering the case for resettling larger numbers of refugees, policymakers 
should consider that refugees are in a very dangerous position, literally running for their 
lives. Refugees contend with psychological effects such as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and depression, as well as a lack of medical care and educational 
opportunities, and increased probabilities of domestic violence and sex trafficking.104  In 
ignoring the plight of refugees, failing to provide political goods and security to them in 
asylum, “It leads to the radicalization and militarization of the displaced,  and causes host 
countries to disregard their own obligations toward refugees, thereby causing even more 
radicalization.”105  Inaction by wealthy countries in providing aid and resettling refugees 
only compounds the security problem, concentrating refugees in deplorable conditions 
with limited peaceful options. Options for policy-makers would therefore fall into two 
categories: resettle more refugees and benefit from their economic contributions and 
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knowledge while reducing the likelihood of creating potential terrorists in a protracted 
refugee camp, or aid from a distance. 
B. CONDITIONS IN CAMPS 
Life in overcrowded refugee camps has severe negative effects on refugees, 
especially in protracted situations. Due to limited resources and cramped living 
conditions, refugees often struggle with legal assistance, sexual violence, malnutrition, 
water and sanitation concerns, as well as the lack of healthcare, education opportunities, 
and economic earning potential.106  The unavailability of basic needs for life and legal 
means of proving citizenship for refugee status place many people in uncertain conditions 
where they may be willing to do nearly anything for survival. Each of the listed hardships 
will be expanded to demonstrate their individual and collective importance for providing 
a way of life for refugees that have left everything behind due to their threatened survival. 
To illustrate the conditions in refugee camps, this thesis will draw information 
from a UN Human Development Research Paper, written by Bart de Bruijn in 2009. This 
study evaluates living conditions and refugee issues through studying protracted refugee 
camps in six countries: Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Thailand. The 
study examines “legal protection, gender-related issues, food security and nutritional 
status, health, education, and refugee livelihoods and coping strategies,” by conducting 
comparing results against UNHCR standards as well as comparing the refugee conditions 
to host country populations and the populations of the country from which the refugees 
have escaped.107  This study will be referenced extensively as a key document to examine 
each of the aforementioned factors and clarify the conditions faced by refugees in 
protracted camp situations.   
Legal assistance is important for refugees for proving citizenship, especially for 
infants that were born during or after the time that the refugee family fled their homeland. 
Birth certificates are required to be issued by the host country to 100% of newborns per 
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the UNHCR standard, and remain important to establish nationality, prove the 
relationship of the child to its parents, as well as to establish an accurate age for 
education, employment records, and possible military service.108  In the report, “slightly 
more than one third of refugee camps reported that all newborns were issued with birth 
certificates, while 3 out of 10 camps reported that none of the newborns were provided 
with a certificate.”109  The lack of legal assistance may force refugees to find means of 
obtaining false or counterfeit documentation and lead to further complications when 
attempting to find resettlement or to return home when hostilities have ceased. 
Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) remains an issue for refugees, 
especially in areas where the rule of law has degraded and protectors are away in 
detention facilities or at work. As de Bruijn states, “Sometimes their economic need 
pushes them to survival sex, and reportedly even the camp management and 
administration processes on which they depend for safety and security may be at the core 
of sexual abuse. Other countries report similar situations with regard to SGBV, 
particularly related to domestic violence, forced marriage, sexual exploitation and 
harassment, attempted rape and rape, and other forms of violence.”110  UNHCR has 
programs to aid in gender equality and empowerment, requiring camp management and 
food distribution committees to maintain at least 50% female representation.111  
However, cultural norms may not nurture female empowerment, which may lead to 
increased tensions between refugees as well as strained relationships between the 
refugees and aid organizations. 
Malnutrition remains a serious issue in refugee camps around the world, 
especially where host governments restrict refugees to camps and prohibit farming. 
Refugees struggle to meet the basic calorie requirements, where “the average amount of 
kilocalories contained in the food basket provided to entitled persons over the period 
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2005–2006 fell short of the standard [≥ 2100 kCal] in four of six countries.”112  
Compounding the problem, refugees may be forced to trade their limited food rations for 
other goods they may not be receiving. Eating limited calories has the second-order 
effects of serious health problems, especially for mothers and infants. While refugees in 
rural camps may have the opportunity to raise animals and farm the land for food, urban-
setting refugees without that prospect may be forced to cope by “taking children out of 
school to work, engaging in transactional sex, and selling household goods.”113 
Access to clean water and camp sanitation have direct outcomes for life and 
health. The UNHCR standard per person for clean water is greater than or equal to 20 
liters per day, to provide for drinking, cooking, cleaning, and agriculture needs.114 This 
standard is not always met, for example, “In the period 2004–2007, only in three out of 
36 occasions camps reported the provision of the required 20 liters, and on ten occasions 
the daily supply was 12 liters or less. In terms of the access indicators of distance to the 
nearest water point [within 200 meters] and persons per water point [< 80], the situation 
in the country is even worse.”115  Seventy-five percent of camps in a 2003–2005 analysis 
of UNHCR Standards and Indicators can provide adequate latrines for refugees, with one 
latrine for two families or roughly 20 people, though issues with sanitation remain in 
certain camps.116 
Healthcare concerns remain a priority for aid, especially in overcrowded camps, 
where “the major killers in refugee settings are, diarrheal diseases, acute respiratory 
infections, malnutrition, measles and malaria.”117 The UNHCR standard of one clinic for 
no more than 10,000 people has been difficult to attain in several camps around the 
world.118  The standard of healthcare quality at a refugee camp is defined relative to the 
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standards in the host country. If healthcare in the camp is superior to local services, 
resentment can fester with the host population and could possibly lead to an expansion of 
services to provide care for that population, further stretching the limited resources.119 
Access to primary school education is important for ensuring child safety and 
providing self-reliance during and after the conflict. The UNHCR standard is 100% 
enrollment for children in primary grades 1–6, and a maximum student to teacher ratio of 
40 to 1.120  In de Bruijn’s research, “Of the 39 camps in the case-study countries, only 24 
(62 percent) satisfied the standard [for number of teachers], which is, however, 
significantly more than the 19 percent that was found in a global evaluation of all camps 
with available statistics.”121  With significant gaps in education, children in protracted 
refugee situations may have few post-conflict opportunities for employment, which may 
increase the likelihood of recruitment into terrorist and other militant organizations. 
Earning potential and economic independence may prove difficult for refugees in 
protracted situations. If they are prohibited from leaving the camp and joining the local 
economy, refugees become “largely dependent on humanitarian aid as main survival 
strategy, in turn sometimes invoking a culture of dependency and undermining their 
capability for sustainable livelihoods either in the country of asylum or upon 
repatriation.”122  Finding gainful employment may not be legal in certain refugee camps, 
resulting in “selling off vital assets such as domestic items, clothes and blankets or part of 
the food rations, or reducing food intake and negotiating loans that cannot be repaid.”123  
Lack of employment and economic despair may be the catalyst for terrorist recruitment 
as a means of survival, leaving few options for fighting-age refugees to provide for basic 
needs.  
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C. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: AID FROM A DISTANCE 
In areas relatively insulated from massive refugee flows, such as the United 
States, it becomes easier for governments to turn a blind eye and conduct financial 
assistance at arm’s length. Western governments may prefer to create safe zones within 
the war-torn country to host refugees under care provided through organizations such as 
UNHCR with specific protections for the inhabitants provided through a coalition of 
military forces and the enforcement of possible no fly zones. In this manner, the safest 
and easiest method to help while keeping refugees outside of one’s own country’s 
borders, to address potential security concerns, would be to increase foreign aid and 
decrease refugee resettlement in the homeland. The safe zone method may also 
artificially reduce the number of refugees by restricting the legal requirement for a 
refugee to cross a border to physically flee the country of danger. As addressed in the 
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the person must be “outside the 
country of his nationality” to obtain legal refugee status.124  In this manner, the 
population would merely be displaced within their own borders, not legally afforded the 
same privileges as a refugee that has crossed into a country of first asylum. On the 
surface, reducing the number of refugees may seem like a temporary cure for the crisis, 
however, this method creates additional requirements for military intervention to enforce 
the area and strips the refugees of internationally afforded benefits.   
Additionally, Jennifer Hyndman addresses the human aspect of refugees, and the 
inadequate response of refugee organizations and western governments to properly care 
for them. She explains that “refugees trade the entitlements of citizenship in their own 
country for safety on terms decided by international legal instruments, host governments, 
and humanitarian agencies.”125  She describes the subhuman view of refugees considered 
a burden to donor governments, and the desire to keep the refugees as far from the donor 
country as possible to help in an area closer to the refugee’s homeland.126  If refugees are 
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prevented from leaving their homeland and kept within their native political borders, they 
are considered internally displaced persons instead of refugees, which places restrictions 
on their international rights.127 
Forcibly containing the displaced persons within their own borders in a 
designated safe zone not only strips them of legal refugee status and the associated 
privileges, it also restricts their rights of freedom of movement within, and to exit the 
territory. As Article 13 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country.”128  The refugees may choose to stay in a designated “safe 
zone,” though their ability to remain productive and add to the economic growth of the 
area will remain severely limited, and they may choose to seek asylum in a safer area 
outside of the conflict area. As Kathleen Newland from the Migration Policy Institute 
states, “Refugees integrate most successfully when there is a compact between 
government and civil society to foster social inclusion and create ties between refugees 
and the people and institutions of their new communities. When those ties are lacking, 
fear and antagonism can grow. When they are strong, refugees can contribute to the 
creation of vibrant communities.”129 
D. RIGHT TO EXCLUDE? 
Independent of binding international agreements and precedent, some argue that a 
sovereign state has the right to exclude whomever it wishes based on their own self-
interest. Christopher Wellman describes “three core premises: (1) legitimate states are 
entitled to political self-determination, (2) freedom of association is an integral 
component of self-determination, and (3) freedom of association entitles one to not 
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associate with others.”130  His argument stresses how “freedom of association entitles one 
to refuse to associate with others, [therefore,] legitimate political states may permissibly 
refuse to associate with any and all potential immigrants who would like to enter their 
political communities.”131 Wellman does not argue that states should aggressively 
exclude others through their borders, but merely explains why they have a right to do 
so.132 His debate later goes on to present cases for open borders based on Egalitarian, 
Libertarian, Democratic, and Utilitarian grounds, followed by a section specifically on 
Refugees. 
Wellman’s argument can be grounded in the liberal nationalist approach of 
restricting immigration or refugees to preserve a “distinctive cultural identity.”133  He 
cites David Miller’s view that: 
People (understandably) care a great deal about the stability of the cultural 
context in which they live, it is also that liberal democratic regimes 
typically function best when there is sufficient trust and fellow-feeling 
among their compatriots. This trust and mutual identification is essential 
because, without it, citizens would be unwilling to make the sacrifices 
necessary to sustain a  robust  and equitable democratic welfare state. And 
finally, Miller  contends that this trust and fellow feeling cannot be 
counted on in  all circumstances; it generally emerges and endures only 
when  there is sufficient cultural homogeneity.134 
This argument toward a uniform cultural identity may hold in countries that are 
culturally homogeneous, however, in a nation as diverse as the United States, with a rich 
fabric of international influence, cultural homogeneity does not exist. 
Philip Cole argues the principle of ethical universalism against the right to 
exclude, defining it as: “a principle of the moral equality of persons, a principle that all 
persons have equal moral value, so that moral principles apply to all equally in the 
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absence of any morally relevant differences.”135  In this sense, each citizen has absolute 
equal treatment from its government. Cole cites philosopher Onora O’neill on moral 
equality: “It seems to me that ... an adequate account of justice has to take seriously the 
often harsh realities of exclusion, whether from citizenship of all states or from 
citizenship in the more powerful and more prosperous states. Why should the boundaries 
of states be viewed as presuppositions of justice rather than as institutions whose justice 
must be assessed?”136  The good fortune to be born into a country that is not torn apart by 
war should not preclude refugees from seeking a reasonable life within the boundaries of 
a safer and more prosperous country, especially when that country has set precedent in 
allowing refugees in the past. 
E. MOVING FORWARD 
How does the United States go about: 1) helping to resolve the refugee crisis, 2) 
respecting refugee rights, and 3) aiding in the humanitarian crisis? As Carl Kaysen states, 
“In crude summary, the international law of refugees says ‘let those people go’; ‘don’t 
send them back where they came from’; but it does not say ‘take those people in.’”137  
The United States leads the world in three distinct areas: military strength, wealth, and 
adherence to and promotion of moral ideals.138 The U.S. has conducted military strikes in 
Syria and clearly opposes the Assad regime. The U.S. is also the largest financial donor 
to the UNHCR, giving $4.5 billion in humanitarian aid since the start of the Syrian 
crisis.139  The lacking element, therefore, is the adherence to the understood moral ideals. 
While 41% of American registered voters support the resettlement of Syrian refugees 
within the U.S., 54% of voters do not believe the U.S. has a responsibility to accept 
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Syrian refugees.140  Unverified claims of an ISIS threat within the Syrian refugee 
population, as well as from other states in the area, creates a largely partisan divide, 
driving policy away from resettlement consideration.  
Many U.S. Senators, at the request of numerous religiously backed organizations, 
urged President Obama to increase the number of refugees accepted for resettlement, 
citing a moral obligation to assist the large numbers of refugees that the neighboring 
countries cannot support.141 President Obama responded by increasing the proposed 
number of resettled Syrian refugees to 10,000 for fiscal year 2016, ultimately committing 
to resettle 12,587.142  Citing concerns of terrorism and inadequate vetting, however, 
President Trump recently placed a 120-day moratorium on refugees, specifying: 
“Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry 
of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and 
thus suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes 
have been made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent 
with the national interest.”143   
Many believe that President Trump’s moratorium on immigration and refugees is 
in line with his campaign promise for the “total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going 
on.”144  The United Nations New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, however, 
“strongly condemn[s] acts and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, 
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xenophobia and related intolerance against refugees and migrants, and the stereotypes 
often applied to them, including on the basis of religion or belief.”145  Former President 
Obama’s response to then candidate Trump, was in line with the United Nations’ 
position, stating: “It is our responsibility to reject religious tests on who we admit into 
this country… It’s our responsibility to reject proposals that Muslim Americans should 
somehow be treated differently.  Because when we travel down that road, we lose.”146  
The decision to resettle Muslim refugees, especially Syrians, may be rooted in partisan 
positions which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Human Rights First advocates for the protection of refugees and a renewal of 
efforts toward setting an example for our allied partners in the care and resettlement of 
refugees. They argue that the U.S. system of refugee admissions and treatment of asylum 
seekers in unnecessarily difficult. The organization provides five key recommendations 
for the return to the spirit and intent of the bipartisan Refugee Act of 1980; “(1) provide 
safeguards against unnecessary and inappropriate detention; (2) restore access to asylum 
and protection; (3) ensure a fair and effective adjudication system for asylum cases; (4) 
improve the resettlement system to better protect the rights of refugees; and (5) promote 
improved oversight and inter-agency coordination on asylum and refugee matters.”147  
Insuring that refugee and asylum seeker processing is conducted in a respectable and 
impartial manner will permit deserving claimants reasonable entry into the United States. 
F. CONCLUSION 
As the discussed research has illustrated, creating protracted refugee situations in 
overcrowded camps where the refugees have little or no mobility within the host state or 
productivity within the local economy will only serve to increase the propensity for 
discontent and the likelihood that these refugees will become attracted to terrorist 
organizations. Committing only aid money without the possibility of resettlement into 
successful economies is a narrow-minded and imprudent method of providing refugee 
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care. Slamming the door on refugees that look to successful Western governments for 
salvation will only reinforce beliefs that the West regards them as disposable and increase 
the numbers of terrorist-allegiant fighters that will seek to do harm. 
Even Wellman, who presented the case for the right to exclude based on a state’s 
self-interest, stated: “I suspect that many of the world’s current policies are more the 
result of unprincipled politicians’ exploiting the xenophobia of their constituents for 
short-term political gain than of well- reasoned assessments of what will be to the long-
term advantage.”148 A nation such as the United States, with established precedent as 
benevolent protector of the downtrodden has the responsibility to allow immigrants and 
refugees to join the fabric of American society and thrive, benefitting not only the 
refugees, but the enrichment of society and the economy as a whole.   
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IV. TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS 
Refugees are often portrayed as a security threat by some, especially refugees 
from areas where terrorist organizations are known to operate. The assumed threat with 
Syrian refugees is their possible direct or indirect ties to terrorist organizations such as 
the Islamic State. Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria experienced 57% of all 
global terrorist attacks in 2014.149 Several other dangerous groups in addition to the 
Islamic State are a threat in Syria, such as the Al-Nusrah Front and the Ansar al-Din 
Front.150 Though terrorism occurs for many causes outside those of radical Islam, much 
of the focus in the modern American understanding of terrorism stems from the 9/11 
attacks, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. This chapter will discuss terrorism, the 
possibility that refugees could pose a security threat, the security threats posed by refugee 
camps, and the policy debate between those that desire more extreme vetting and those 
that desire expanded refugee resettlement. 
A. TERRORISM 
Terrorism is explained by Paul Wilkinson as: “The systematic use of murder and 
destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction to terrorize individuals, groups, 
communities, or governments into conceding to the terrorists’ political demands.”151  He 
emphasizes that a liberal democratic government battling terrorists must adhere to the 
human rights and freedoms inherent in the democratic system, lest they overstep their 
authority and play into the hand of the terrorists.152   By overreacting to terrorist actions, 
governments are likely to give undue legitimacy to the terrorist group, and inadvertently 
advance their cause. He notes, “The government must show that its measures against 
terrorism are solely directed at quelling the terrorists and their collaborators and at 
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defending society against terrorist attack.”153  For this reason, policymakers are advised 
to be wary of lumping all Muslims together as terrorists, when the true goal is to narrow 
the battle to bona fide terrorists. For example, immediately following the attacks of 9/11, 
President Bush did not blame Islam or the Arabs, instead saying “Our enemy is a radical 
network of terrorists and every government that supports them.”154  
The United States is no stranger to terrorist acts, though the shift of public focus 
to attacks based on Islamic extremism spiked following the attack on September 11, 
2001. Christopher Hewitt evaluates the history of terrorism in America, addressing 
attacks with roots in radical Islam, as well as homegrown terrorists including: right wing 
extremists, revolutionary left wing movements, and other terror movements based in race 
relations or religion.155 In Table 1, Hewitt’s figures are shown to demonstrate the 
percentages of incidents and fatalities attributed to each group between 1954 and 2000. 
Hewitt refers to émigrés when “a foreign victim is attacked within the United States by a 
foreign terrorist group, generally [involving] issues which lie outside American society 
and politics.”156  In white racist/Rightist groups, Hewitt includes groups such as the Ku 
Klux Klan, “the Order (Silent Brotherhood), the White People’s Party, the Covenant, 
Sword, and Arm of the Lord, the National Socialist White People’s Party, and Posse 
Comitatus.”157  For the revolutionary left, the groups generally profess Socialist or 
Communist ideologies and revolutionary methods for hostile reorganization of the state, 
though Hewitt specifically mentions the Weather Underground.158  The movement of the 
revolutionary left posed the most serious threat to the U.S. in the 1960s, though it 
significantly declined with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.159  
                                                 
153Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 128.  
154Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America, 5.  
155Ibid., 15. 
156Ibid. 
157Ibid., 19.   
158Ibid., 17.   
159Dale L. Watson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, February 6, 2002, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-terrorist-threat-
confronting-the-united-states. 
 41
Contemporary leftist groups tend to be single-issue, focusing on environmental and 
animal rights concerns.  
Table 1.   U.S. Terrorist Incidents and Fatalities by Those Responsible, 
1954–2000160 
Type of Terrorism Incidents Fatalities 
            
Foreign 
   Cuban émigré 5.2 % 1.5 % 
   Puerto Rican 11.9 % 4.3 % 
   Islamic 1.1 % 1.7 % 
   Other Foreign 2.1 % 4.1 % 
Domestic Terrorism 
   White racist/Rightista 31.2 % 51.6 % 
   Revolutionary Left 21.2 % 2.0 % 
   Black Militants 14.7 % 25.0 % 
   Anti-Abortionist 6.2 % 0.9 % 
   Pro-Jewish 3.6 % 0.80% 
   Other domestic/unknown 2.8 % 8.1 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 
Total Number 3,228 661 
            
a Includes Oklahoma City Bombing (168 fatalities) 
 
Hewitt discusses extremism as a concept compared to the general social 
viewpoint toward the conventional political and social views at any given time.161  The 
cases in Table 1 represent the struggle of minorities with extreme viewpoints, using 
unspeakable violence as a means of achieving the widespread awareness for their chosen 
perspective. In the U.S. as well as abroad, terrorist groups generally represent an 
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underrepresented or disenfranchised minority that desire a means to communicate their 
grievances to the public through violence. 
Martha Crenshaw evaluates common themes in terrorist motivations as both 
behaviors of the state and the goals of the organizations for which the state is oppressing 
as preconditions for terrorism.162 Groups such as the Islamic State are able to gain 
attention because, “violence and bloodshed always excite human curiosity, and the 
theatricality, suspense, and threat of danger inherent in terrorism enhance its attention-
getting qualities.”163 Furthermore, “As the audience grows larger, more diverse, and 
more accustomed to terrorism, terrorists must go to extreme lengths to shock.”164  
Footage of IS’s brutal beheadings and burning their prisoners alive are understood to 
strike fear into their enemies and reinforced their reputation for absolute control. These 
attacks build confidence for their fighters and encourage recruitment by appealing to oft 
oppressed, scorned Western Muslims looking to advance what seems to be a meaningful 
cause. 
Some researchers conclude that American citizens are more likely to commit 
terror acts than actors from outside organizations. In a 2014 thesis examining the link 
between types of citizenship and terrorism, Kyle Recker concluded: “Terrorism 
conducted by United States citizens, both native and naturalized, is the predominant form 
of terrorism in the United States.”165 Additionally, in a report by the Institute for 
Homeland Security Solutions, Kevin Strom et. al advise homeland security officials to 
continue to pursue groups like Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM), but also to 
focus on homegrown groups, stating: “Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had 
links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or 
anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways.”166 In their 
research, they conclude: “Although AQAM and AQAM inspired plots were responsible 
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for a plurality of attacks in our study (40 out of 86), white supremacist and militia/anti-
government groups were also responsible for a significant number of attacks (20 and 12 
plots, respectively),” for a representative total 32 of the 86 attacks.167  This is not to 
diminish the threat of AQAM, but rather to illustrate the prevalence of other serious 
threats which are largely unrecognized by the American public and dominating headlines 
in policy decisions.    
To focus on the threat of radical Islam and the fears of increased jihadist attacks 
on American soil, Daniel Byman details the rise of groups such as Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State. Byman discusses jihadist fighters in the immediate regions of influence of 
the terror groups, and addresses the recruitment and radicalization of westerners to act in 
a “lone wolf” capacity in support for the cause.168  He continues his analysis of the 
Islamic State, describing their end state goals and their particular threat to the American 
homeland security.169  
War-torn areas of the Middle East have been breeding grounds for terrorist 
movements from Afghanistan in the 1990s to modern Iraq and Syria. Militant 
organizations such as IS are able to carve out territory in otherwise loosely governed 
spaces to call their own, shielded by the sovereignty of the host state until they have 
amassed enough force to assert dominance, which poses a threat to international order 
and security.170 Anne Marie Baylouny discusses the variables for the “generation of 
authority in areas of the Middle East unregulated by the state: the initial basis for 
claiming influence, the method of legitimation, and the services that popularly validate 
the claim to authority.”171  Means of gaining legitimacy for non-state actors such as IS 
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include: the uses of religion, violence, and shared identity.172 There have been no 
shortages in opportunities for militant groups to fulfill these requirements, establish 
dominance, and attack the host state and any rival factions.   
The Islamic State was a spin-off of Al Qaeda, started by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
and now led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, seeking to hold territory and develop a state based 
on their version of Sunni Islam.173 IS has grown in size and scope, unique from Al Qaeda 
in that it “coerces local populations while advertising to a global audience.”174 Its 
caliphate vision encompasses all Muslims, seeing itself as “the only Sunni militant group 
capable of fighting the government of Iraq and the only authentic jihadi group in Syria 
and, indeed, the world.”175 The group “believes the world order to be illegitimate and 
seeks to redraw today’s world map and create a global Islamic state, a caliphate, akin to 
that which predates the modern state system. Accordingly, the group is intent on pursuing 
the acquisition of additional territories beyond Iraq and Syria.”176 They view Muslims 
that choose not to join their cause as apostates and infidels. The Islamic State adheres to a 
millenarian worldview, where their claimed caliphate is at the center of a grand, 
apocalyptic battle for Allah.177  Syria lies at the heart of the conflict, as Muhammad’s 
prophesy directs true believers to gather and fight in Syria and Yemen.178 
Several attacks in Europe have occurred that have been attributed to IS operatives 
activated from within European society or imbedded within the relatively unchecked 
refugee population. On November 13, 2015, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for a 
series of suicide bombings and mass shooting attacks in Paris, killing 129 people, and 
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injuring another 352.179  France had also been the target for a previous set of five terrorist 
attacks killing 12 people January 7 through 9 of 2015, with Al Qaeda of the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) claiming responsibility, in response to satirical depictions of the 
prophet Mohammad by the magazine Charlie Hebdo.180  Additionally, on March 22, 
2016, attacks were conducted in Brussels, Belgium, with coordinated bombings at the 
Zaventem airport and Maalbeek metro station. The Islamic State claimed responsibility 
for these attacks, which killed 32 people and injured over 300.181  Belgium was a target 
of the Islamic State due to its participation in the bombing of IS forces in Syria. Belgium 
has become a source for recruiting jihadist forces to fight for the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq, as well as a hotbed for terrorist cells operating within its borders.182  
With IS-attributed attacks taking place in Europe, attacks inspired by IS in the 
United States must be examined to evaluate the viability of a homeland security threat. 
Despite massive geographic separation between the United States and the Middle East, 
the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for carrying out attacks on U.S. soil. Due to 
extensive recruiting by print and internet media, IS has succeeded in radicalizing 
Muslims already residing in America to carry out attacks on the homeland. Several 
terrorist attacks have occurred on U.S. soil since the formation of the Islamic State, but 
the attacks specifically claimed by the IS include the May 3, 2015, Curtis Culwell Center 
shooting in Garland, TX, and the June 12, 2016, Orlando, FL, night club shooting.183 The 
December 2, 2015, mass shooting in San Bernardino, CA, is undergoing investigation, 
but speculated to be linked to the Islamic State. Other attacks motivated by radical Islam 
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but not directly tied to the Islamic State have occurred on U.S. soil, furthering American 
Islamophobia and driving citizens to criticize the acceptance of refugees from areas 
occupied by the Islamic State. 
In a study by the Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 59 people were 
identified as supporting IS in the U.S. between March 2014 and June 22, 2015, with 3 
suspects being killed by police while attempting to conduct an attack, and 56 charged in 
U.S. federal court.184 Most of the cases involved individuals traveling to Iraq and Syria as 
foreign fighters, though 17 were involved in domestic plots.185  From their study, 81% 
were U.S. citizens, and “belong to a wide swath of ethnic backgrounds, including 
African, African American, Caucasian, Central Asian, Eastern European, and South 
Asian. Few are of Middle Eastern Arab descent.”186 The motivations of these individuals 
to support IS include: “resentment over U.S. foreign policy and personal alienation from 
U.S. society,” “pride in ISIS’s conquests abroad,” and “frustration with being ‘caged’ 
inside the United States.”187  Of the 17 domestic plotters, 14 were U.S. citizens, 1 was 
Yemeni, 1 was Sudanese, and 1 was Saudi Arabian.188 
B. ARE REFUGEES A SECURITY THREAT? 
The security fears of refugee acceptance are predicated on the notion that refugees 
may support or engage in terrorism, and that the information available for background 
checks are insufficient to properly vet candidates for resettlement into the United States. 
The conduct of terrorist attacks in Europe as well as in America with direct and indirect 
links to the Islamic State have fueled fears that the resettling of Syrian refugees onto 
American soil will present a vulnerability in security that can easily be penetrated by 
Islamic State operatives. As discussed in previous chapters, the refugees are fleeing their 
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homelands because of the attacks on them by terrorist groups as well as the Assad 
regime. Islamic State-affiliated operatives may have been able to embed within the 
refugee population fleeing Syria and gained access to Europe through porous borders. 
Without the thorough security checkpoints and screening process employed by USCIS, 
European countries have experienced increased vulnerability to attacks attributed to IS. 
Cases of European migrant-related terrorism will be evaluated against reports of benign 
U.S. resettled refugees.  
The bipartisan Homeland Security Committee (HSC) addresses terrorist 
operatives gaining access to major European cities by the flows of refugees from war-
torn Middle Eastern countries, providing a greater ease in infiltrating security measures 
that had not previously been available.189 The Committee cites that Islamic State jihadists 
are aware of the relaxed travel restrictions in Europe, and published an e-book to its 
fighters describing the ease of travel through the continent.190  The preliminary findings 
of the HSC show that “at least one terrorist responsible for the Paris attacks is suspected 
of having entered Europe through refugee flows,” and “In the days leading up to the Paris 
attacks, officials in Europe warned that ISIS was deliberately targeting these routes.”191  
Additionally, they note, “An international terrorism research organization published a 
bulletin in September warning that there were already a number of reported cases of ISIS 
infiltration of refugee routes.”192  
German reports cite that the Islamic State has been infiltrating refugee routes 
through investigations of 10 cases where IS operatives were posing as Syrian refugees.193 
Reports from other European countries’ security agencies state they had discovered 
individuals with ties to IS at an attempted border crossing.194  A USCIS official and 
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several senior FBI officials have expressed concern to HSC about the lack of official 
records from areas of conflict to be used in the vetting process.195  IS operatives have 
been able to more easily access Europe due to closer geographical distance and sheer 
volume of migrants crossing borders, and the Islamic State’s claims on inspiring attacks 
in Europe are more plausible due to the access. 
In response to these attacks, European Union (EU) ministers recognized the faults 
in allowing nearly unrestricted travel between EU countries following the Schengen 
rules, and aim to increase security at border crossings to stem the flow of terrorist 
travel.196 The Schengen agreement has been in effect and has permitted the flow of 
citizens throughout most of Europe since 1985, permitting travel between European 
countries as easy as driving between states in America. Security background checks were 
not completed and information was not shared between responsible agencies, leading to a 
lack of intelligence about the arrival of the operatives and the dissemination of pertinent 
information to other agencies. The European systems of verification are not as thorough 
as the system currently in place in the U.S., and many of the migrants in Europe have not 
officially filed as refugees. The European commission is proposing to create a joint 
intelligence service of EU countries to fill the void in intelligence, but the larger 
hegemonic powers are reluctant to share their operational secrets and intelligence 
methods with less-abled partners.197   
Most of these refugees have been entering the European Union countries through 
Greece, which has been reluctant to receive help from neighboring countries, and has 
been failing to complete the necessary security steps and biometric data collection 
necessary for halting the flow of terrorist operatives into western societies.198  The 
European Union has dedicated $541 million for correcting the border control and refugee 
management shortfalls in Greece, though most of the funds were not transferred due to a 
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lack of extensive strategic planning on behalf of the Greeks, and resulted in emergency 
assistance from UNHCR.199 Some European countries are frustrated with the lack of 
security checks completed by their counterparts. According to a refugee in Germany, 
“any ISIS terrorist could have entered Italy and traveled further into Europe without any 
problem. ISIS members can take their guns and hand grenades with them, because the 
Italians never even checked any of the luggage.”200 The issue concerning the ease of 
travel with the Schengen rules is the relative ease of travel to the United States from 
European countries, and the American security concerns that result if the members have 
not been properly examined by European authorities before boarding transportation from 
the continent. 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 of 2014 addresses the 
international movement of terrorist fighters and the necessary safeguards to ensure that 
the refugee flows are not penetrated by terrorist organizations.201  The resolution calls for 
a redoubling of efforts by member states regarding terrorism, largely in relation to 
seeking out terrorists and supporters, preventing their travel and disrupting support 
networks. Recognizing the expansion in numbers of European fighters to fight on behalf 
of the Islamic State in Syria as well as the growing desire to support the Islamic State by 
other means, the Resolution seeks to further discourage the support of terrorist 
organizations and to empower representative governments to combat terrorism. 
Strengthening European controls on the migrant population will provide greater security, 
but hold no direct bearing on the access of terrorist members through the U.S. refugee 
program, which continues to maintain separate and vigorous vetting standards. 
In support of the belief that U.S. refugee security measures should be stronger, 
Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation testified to the House Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, regarding the different 
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active terrorist groups and their direct and indirect threat to U.S. national security. He 
specifically mentions the relatively low threat of any terrorist attacks by refugees, citing 
specific examples of ten refugees that have been involved with charges of terrorism since 
2009, though none of them successful attacks, and none of them Syrian.202 He outlines 
several measures to expand the security measures in vetting Syrian refugees such as 
“additional background checks and other screening protocols,” “enhanced re-screening 
procedures,” and “improved data management,” though he does not delineate any 
specific means or methods to accomplish his recommendations.203   
Separately, the CATO Institute’s Alex Nowrasteh conducted a risk analysis for 
terrorism and immigration. Examining the period between 1975 and 2015, he found that 
“the chance of an American perishing in a terrorist attack on U.S. soil that was committed 
by a foreigner over the 41-year period studied here is 1 in 3.6 million per year.”204 
Additionally, “the chance of an American being murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a 
refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year while the chance of being murdered in an attack 
committed by an illegal immigrant is an astronomical 1 in 10.9 billion per year [italics in 
original text].”205 For context, the lifetime odds of being killed in a motor vehicle 
accident are 1 in 113, unintentional drowning death odds are 1 in 1,183, and 1 in 174,426 
for death by lightning strike.206  To emphasize the point, an average American is nearly 
21,000 times more likely to die in a lightning strike than from a refugee terrorist attack. 
Nowrasteh notes 20 refugees that perpetrated terrorist attacks since 1975 out of the 
3,252,493 refugees admitted to the U.S. during that time.207 He examines further, that 
“Of the 20, only three were successful in their attacks, killing a total of three people… 
The three refugee terrorists were Cubans who committed their attacks in the 1970s and 
were admitted before the Refugee Act of 1980 created the modern rigorous refugee-
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screening procedures currently in place.”208  In 2011, the FBI arrested and convicted two 
resettled Iraqi citizens in Bowling Green, Kentucky, Waad Ramadan Alwan and 
Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, for attempting to provide material support to terrorists in 
Iraq.209 
C. THE DANGER OF REFUGEE CAMPS 
Concerns with refugees remaining in camps within countries of first asylum 
include increased exposure to violent elements, becoming a target of attack due to the aid 
available within camps, and the possibility for recruitment into terrorist organizations 
while remaining in poor living conditions for extended periods of time. Refugees en 
masse within neighboring countries of first asylum pose a larger threat to the political 
system of host countries by drastically altering the demographics and political goods that 
must then be allocated for unexpectedly large numbers of evacuees. Large numbers of 
refugees consolidated just beyond hostile borders pose several potential consequences 
which may have second order consequences which are more dangerous to both refugees 
and the security of international spectator states. Issues of sovereignty violation for the 
offending state may also be a factor, limiting outside aid to refugees that have fled their 
home countries and sources of oppression.210  Third party states may be able to morally 
discount the sovereignty principle, as state “legitimacy is understood in terms of 
satisfactorily protecting the rights of one’s constituents and respecting the rights of all 
others. And any state that persecutes its own citizens … clearly does not adequately 
secure the human rights of its citizens and thus is manifestly not entitled to the normal 
sovereign rights that typically make humanitarian intervention in principle wrong.”211  
The protection of human rights would supersede sovereignty in this example, establishing 
a moral imperative for external intervention. 
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Loescher and Milner address the security concerns inherent in maintaining 
protracted refugee camps, calling attention to the greater propensity for regional 
instability and the recruitment of displaced persons into a life of crime or terrorism 
because of prolonged life in a refugee camp.212 Loescher and Milner cite additional 
“security concerns, such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking in women and 
children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries, [which] are known to 
occur in camps hosting protracted refugee situations.”213 As refugees remain in first 
asylum countries for longer periods of time, the host government is more likely to keep 
them isolated within camps to prevent local ethnic and political conflicts. As the refugees 
grow reliant on the camps, they become “wholly dependent on international assistance, 
[which] prevents them from pursuing economic self-reliance, and precludes them from 
contributing to the development of their host communities and states.”214 A possible 
solution, therefore, is for donor governments to assist in the repatriation, local integration, 
or resettlement of refugees to provide a lasting way of life outside of a refugee camp.215  
Resettling the refugees away from the harsh conditions of the camps can reduce the 
propensity for disillusioned, fighting-age refugees that may otherwise seek protection 
from terrorist organizations. Additionally, food and aid supplies provided to the camps 
may attract terrorist attacks on the refugee population due to the availability of scarce 
resources.216 
Risks of increased violent political action in the form of demonstrations or 
possible attraction into terrorist organizations may increase as fighting-age refugees are 
left waiting in refugee camps close to the conflict area. Jack Goldstone specifically 
stresses the link between violence and the ability of an absorbing society of first asylum 
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to handle the large influx of displaced persons.217  Certain factors stemming from mass 
migration may increase the likelihood for political violence due to the upset in the 
“balance between population change and the absorptive capacity of the [receiving] 
economy,” specifically, “rapid growth in the labor force relative to the growth of the 
economy, unequal population growth rates between different ethnic groups, …migrations 
that change the local balance among major ethnic groups, [and] shifts in age distribution 
that create relatively large youth cohorts.”218  This large number of disenfranchised 
youths then have a greater likelihood to become involved in political movements and 
violence due to a lack of adult family obligations and employment.219  In relocating 
displaced youths through refugee resettlement programs, the “youth bulge” can be 
dispersed throughout a greater geographic area, reducing the risk of violent conflict 
between groups.220  Additionally, removing the youths from the area through resettlement 
programs reduces the risk of their involvement with criminal and terrorist organizations 
because of the new opportunities in a peaceful nation.   
To make a financial argument against resettlement, Mark Krikorian, Executive 
Director at the Center for Immigration Studies, testified before Congress that the cost for 
settling one refugee in the United States is equal to the cost of supporting 12 refugees in 
their home region.221  Mr. Krikorian argues that the most responsible use for American 
tax dollars allocated for refugee aid is to use those funds to help the most amount of 
people while maintaining the highest levels of national security.222  As discussed, 
protracted refugee camps are far more dangerous for the refugees with regard to harsh 
living conditions and increased exposure to terrorist elements, and increase the likelihood 
that refugees will join terrorist groups as a method of survival. Increased access to a pool 
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of potential terrorists then results in a wider regional and global security threat. Fiscal 
responsibility has its own set of constraints for lawmakers beyond the scope of this thesis, 
and is not used as the basis for grounding security conclusions for policy. 
D. POLICY DEBATE 
The perception of a lack of background information available to vet the refugees 
for entry remains a chief concern for admitting Syrian refugees into the United States. 
Although numerous methods are available to various agencies with respect to biometric 
data and interpersonal network connections, there is no Syrian government database of 
information available to obtain the data or security institutions similar to those in the 
United States. The two sides of the policy debate are: the push for greater vetting 
standards and a possible moratorium on refugees, and the allowance of more refugees 
based on the lack of credible refugee terrorist threat. 
1. Argument to Restrict 
According to Bollfrass, et al., “31 [state] governors and almost all the Republican 
presidential candidates oppose further refugee settlement in the United States.”223  To 
make the case for expanded vetting, FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach stated in a 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
“The concern in Syria is that we don’t have the systems in places on the ground to collect 
the information.… All of the data sets, the police, the intel services that normally you 
would go and seek that information [from], don’t exist.”224  Furthermore, the Assad 
regime has no interest in sharing any information that could possibly help the United 
States and European allies in resettling its population. Obtaining sufficient data to 
determine the appropriate security for the refugees remains a sticking point in the 
struggle to admit more legitimate refugees into the United States to support European 
counterparts. 
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In response to the supposed threat of Islamic State operatives gaining entry 
through the refugee program, legislators have begun drafting additional measures to 
control refugee flow. A bill known as the “Stop Extremists Coming Under Refugee Entry 
Act” or the “SECURE Act,” championed by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) is currently 
under review. This legislation calls for additional biometric data to be logged for refugees 
arriving in America, and calls for a temporary moratorium on refugees from 34 “high 
risk” countries, including Syria, until all the additional security measures have been 
enacted and a subsequent law is enacted to permit the lifting of the moratorium.225 
To expand the current U.S. refugee screening process and involve personal 
accountability of major program directors, House Resolution 4038 was proposed in 
November of 2015. Under H.R. 4038, the “American Security Against Foreign Enemies 
Act of 2015’’ or the ‘‘American SAFE Act of 2015,” championed by Representatives 
McCaul (R-TX) and Hudson (R-NC), call for unanimous concurrence and a personal 
certification by the Secretary of Homeland Defense, the Director of the FBI, and the 
Director of National Intelligence before the candidate under review is admitted into the 
United States.226  In response, President Obama’s position to keep the refugee screening 
process in its current state, which provides the “most rigorous and thorough security 
screening of anyone admitted into the United States,” is outlined in his position to veto 
H.R. 4038’s measures to expand security measures to the refugee screening process.227 
2. Argument to Expand 
The debate of those arguing for the admission of more refugees is centered on the 
data that refugees are not to blame for the terrorist acts that have been committed in 
America. For example, Senator Tom Carper (D-DE), testified:  
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We could shut down all travel and immigration to this country and still not 
be safe from terrorist threats. That’s because—as Peter Bergen testified in 
November—“every person who’s been killed by a jihadi terrorists in this 
country since 9/11 has been killed by an American citizen or resident.” 
The people who carried out these attacks weren’t foreign students, tourists 
or refugees. They were American citizens or legal residents. And in many 
cases, they had spent much of their lives in the United States.228 
Senator Carper’s testimony echoes the data presented earlier that terrorist acts are 
mainly conducted by American citizens. Refugees have not presented a credible terrorist 
threat on par with plots and attacks conducted by native and naturalized U.S. citizens.   
Refugees may help provide intelligence information to U.S. security agencies 
once resettled in America, filling a critical gap in first-hand knowledge. As Patrick 
Eddington, a policy analyst and former CIA Officer, noted: “Welcoming and working 
alongside these refugees would provide Western governments with exactly the kind of 
information they are seeking: the names, photographs, and other personally identifying 
information on ISIS militants who attacked them and drove them from their homes.”229  
What better way to gather the necessary intelligence to fill the asserted intelligence gaps 
than first-hand knowledge from the very people IS attacked?  Instead of treating refugees 
as potential threats, they could be valuable assets in the fight against actual terrorists. Of 
course, providing information and helping U.S. intelligence agencies would require the 
refugees to be treated like welcomed members of American society rather than outcast 
second-class citizens and potential threats. Furthermore, “If these communities perceive 
discrimination from their hosts, radical Islamic ideology may find a receptive audience, 
particularly among second- and third-generation children of refugees.”230   
Islamic State operatives have far greater access to potential supporters through 
internet recruitment than through refugees. Of the 28 IS cases in the U.S. between 2014–
                                                 
228Tom Carper, “Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS,” Statement to the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, May 26, 2016, 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/statement-of-ranking-member-tom-carper-protecting-
america-from-the-threat-of-isis.  
229Patrick G. Eddington, “Refugee Resettlement: The Smart Way to Defeat ISIS,” The CATO 
Institute, November 23, 2015, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/refugee-resettlement-smart-
way-defeat-isis. 
230Bollfrass, Shaver, and Zhou, “Don’t Fear Refugees.”  
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2016, each attack planned or carried out has been IS-inspired through the internet or other 
means of contact.231 No attack has been carried out by an IS operative that has gained 
access through the refugee program. IS does not need the refugee program, as it is able to 
inspire legal residents of the U.S. to complete their attacks: “Few ISIS soldiers or other 
terrorists are going to spend at least three years in a refugee camp for a 0.042 percent 
chance of entering the United States when almost any other option to do so is easier, 
cheaper, and quicker.”232 The Islamic State most likely recognizes the difficulty in 
penetrating the U.S. refugee program, and realistically, has no operational need to do so. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Evidence shows that the odds of a refugee-conducted terrorist attack in the United 
States are extremely low. The Islamic State has been able to accomplish its objective of 
conducting attacks in the U.S. by simply radicalizing American citizens already inside the 
borders. The depth and scope of the current screening process is sufficient in weeding out 
potential terrorists. IS could continue to use internet radicalization or use other options to 
enter the U.S. through alternate means of travel, and therefore has no need to risk capture 
in trying to infiltrate the refugee program. European countries have had their share of 
security issues stemming from the migration crisis but that is not the same as refugees 
applying for resettlement in the U.S. through USCIS and enduring the associated 
screenings. Entry through Europe remains a threat, but is not relevant to the case of 
terrorists infiltrating the U.S. refugee program. Arguments against refugee resettlement 
have no basis in factual accounts of attacks by refugees. Policymakers’ request of 
additional vetting measures and more rigorous processes with specificity into what is 
lacking from the process remains absent from any argument to suspend refugee 
resettlement.  
                                                 
231Homeland Security Committee, “Terror Gone Viral: Overview of the 100+ ISIS-Linked Plots 
Against the West,” July 2016, 8–15, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/100-ISIS-
Linked-Plots-Report-.pdf. 
232Alex Nowrasteh, “Syrian Refugees Don’t Pose a Serious Security Threat,” CATO at Liberty, 
(blog), November 18, 2015, https://www.cato.org/blog/syrian-refugees-dont-pose-serious-security-threat. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addressed the question, “what are the security risks associated with 
accepting Syrian refugees into the United States, and how is this affecting U.S. refugee 
policy with respect to national security?”  The slaughter of innocent civilians and the 
destruction of homes have caused millions of refugees to flee their homes in Syria into 
neighboring countries and Europe. The United States is faced with two choices:  
1. The moral imperative of aiding in humanitarian relief via refugee 
resettlement, practicing Islamic inclusion and reducing the potential 
terrorist recruiting pool, or  
2. Securing the borders against Syrian refugees based on a possibility that the 
Islamic State may infiltrate operatives through the vetting process and gain 
access to American soil.  
To make the determination of which option to choose, one must examine the 
current methods of vetting, compare the humanitarian need to remove refugees from 
camps into a more permanent solution, and examine the actual threat of terrorists 
infiltrating the refugee program. If policymakers choose to accept more Syrian refugees, 
Islamic cultural inclusion in the United States will expand, removing the Islamic State’s 
ideological ammunition that the United States discriminates against Muslims. There is a 
slight possibility that operatives may infiltrate the program, though the evidence 
presented shows that is highly unlikely. The United States will curry favor with the 
international community because of increased humanitarian assistance, and greater 
numbers of needy Syrian families will have a new lease on life and a chance to contribute 
to the rich fabric of American society. 
If policymakers choose to halt the acceptance of Syrian refugees, the Islamic State 
will not have the possibility to infiltrate operatives through the program. Ideological 
ammunition for IS will increase from an overt ban on Muslims entering the United States, 
possibly increasing the pool of terrorist operatives with disdain for the West. The Islamic 
State would continue to recruit U.S. citizens through the Internet or find alternative 
means to access American soil. With the comparison from the options presented, if 
admitting more refugees presents a greater security threat than would result from the 
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hazards of a protracted refugee camp, government officials can make the appropriate 
determination.   
A. METHOD 
Chapter II discussed the U.S. policy for resettling refugees and the vetting process 
that applicants must undergo for approval. The U.S. policy on refugee resettlement has a 
history starting from commitments made following World War II. International 
organizations and the UNHCR depend on wealthy and generous governments like the 
United States to provide financial aid and assist in refugee resettlement. Millions of 
refugees have been admitted into the United States spanning several conflicts, and 
continue to enrich American society through diverse experiences and cultures. The 
current process of vetting refugees, through available official documentation, biometric 
data, a network of multiple extensive databases, and lengthy and exhaustive interviewing, 
has shown to adequately determine the eligibility and security of applicants. Though no 
comprehensive Syrian government database exists for comparison, the vast national and 
international databases that are available to U.S. agencies provide ample information for 
USRAP and USCIS to use in determination. The interview process is lengthy and 
laborious, spanning several years and examining every aspect of a candidate’s life and 
personal associations to root out any possible connections to nefarious organizations. Any 
hint of direct or indirect support to terrorist organizations is immediate cause for 
repetitive screenings or outright dismissal from consideration.  
Chapter III examined the importance of refugee status, conditions in refugee 
camps, the limited benefit of aiding from a distance, if states have the right to exclude 
certain people from entry, and how to move forward in providing the appropriate aid. The 
importance of designation as a refugee was shown to demonstrate the differences in 
rights to those afforded refugee status, and how the loss of such designation can lead to a 
loss in aid and assistance. By detaining possible refugees within a “safe zone” in their 
own country’s borders, governments not only restrict the UN-mandated human right of 
freedom of movement, but also strip the designation as a refugee and replace it with 
designation as an internally displaced person. 
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Conditions in refugee camps proved to be taxing for the refugees as well as for 
the institutions in the governments hosting the refugees. Sexual abuse, malnourishment, 
lack of education opportunities, and lack of economic earning potential compounded the 
post-traumatic stress of the conflict to create deplorable conditions for life. Helping the 
refugees in these situations by resettling them in other countries removes them from the 
threat environment and allows them to flourish in a safe environment and contribute to a 
diverse and productive society. 
Chapter IV focused on terrorism, the possibility that refugees could pose a 
security threat, the security threats posed by refugee camps, and the policy debate 
between those that desire more extreme vetting and those that desire expanded refugee 
resettlement. Different terrorist groups that have conducted attacks in the United States 
were examined. The data shows that U.S. citizens, native and naturalized, have 
committed far more terrorist attacks than from abroad, with right-wing extremists 
representing a threat nearly equal to Al Qaeda. Support and attacks attributed to the 
Islamic State have all been through the recruitment and radicalization of American 
citizens rather than operatives gaining entry through the refugee program.   
Protracted refugee situations were shown to be a target for militant organizations 
for two reasons: the availability of otherwise scant resources, and the presence of 
disillusioned fighting-age refugees who may be tempted to join terrorist organizations as 
a means of survival. To this end, merely providing financial aid to keep the refugees out 
of America and within the countries of first asylum only serves to increase the notion that 
America is at war with Islam, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy and serves to 
legitimize the radical ideologies of extremist groups.   
The policy debate was presented to contrast those that wish to restrict refugee 
resettlement and those that wish to expand. To restrict the program, proponents cited the 
lack of official documentation from the Syrian government and the threats in Europe 
through mass migration and attacks. New measures were proposed which would require 
direct approval of refugees by heads of investigating organizations, but do not specify 
any new means for expanding security procedures. Officials wishing to expand the 
program cited the overwhelming evidence of terrorist attacks committed by American 
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citizens, and the benefit of refugees to aid in intelligence gathering against the Islamic 
State.   
After reviewing the policy, vetting procedures, humanitarian considerations, and 
security concerns, this thesis concludes that it is highly implausible that terrorist 
operatives would use the U.S. refugee program as a means of entering the country. 
Considering the lengthy and rigorous vetting process and the likelihood of a refugee 
conducting a terrorist attack once through the approval and resettlement process, 
organizations like IS have far more means at their disposal to attack America than 
through the refugee program. Entering the U.S. via other means with forged 
documentation, smuggled by air, land, or boat, or merely using the internet to radicalize 
American citizens are far less dangerous and time-consuming for the organization. The 
Islamic State has claimed several attacks with devastating effect that did not subject the 
attackers to the level of scrutiny and security which are provided through the U.S. refugee 
admissions program. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis concludes that policy makers have an interest in expanding the refugee 
admissions from terrorist-controlled areas such as Syria from both humanitarian and 
security standpoints. The dangers posed to refugees left waiting in camps only serve to 
increase the likelihood that new members would be recruited from their ranks, adding to 
regional and global security vulnerabilities. The security measures in use by refugee 
processing agencies are more than adequate to root out potential terrorists. The United 
States could benefit from the diversity in experience and culture provided by the 
incoming refugees, dispelling the belief that America is at war with Islam by welcoming 
those in need with open arms. The United States can lead the international community 
with increased humanitarian assistance, and allow greater numbers of needy Syrian 
families to have a new lease on life and a chance to succeed in American society. 
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